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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL MORRISON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960064-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
i^RIgDICTIQN AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
convicted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (1995), in the Seqond Judicial District
Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Stanton M. Taylor, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to

review this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e)
(Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

conditionally admitting highly probative evidence?

"When

reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of
evidence under rules 4 03 and 4 04, [Utah Rules of Evidence, the
reviewing] court will sustain the trial court's ruling unless it
constitutes and abuse of discretion.
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 1996).

State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah

ME]ven if the court erred in

admitting the challenged evidence, * [the appellate court] will
only reverse if the error was harmful, "i.e., if absent the error
there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to
the defendant.'"" Id. (citing State v. White. 880 P.2d 18, 21
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221
(Utah 1993)) .
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to

grant defendant's motion for a mistrial where the court instead
gave a curative instruction in a case of overwhelming evidence?
%X

A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a

mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion."

State v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah

App. 1995), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted).
3.

Was the prosecutor's comment on defendant's post-arrest

silence prejudicial, considering all the evidence, and did his
cross examination of a hostile, responsive witness constitute a
denial of defendant's right to confrontation?

These issues were

not presented to the trial court and are presented to this Court
for de novo review under the plain error doctrine.

State v.

Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative portions of the following constitutional
provisions, statutes and rules are set out in Addendum A:

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995);
Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence; and
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Michael Morrison, was charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) (Count
I), enhanced by being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1994), and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a convicted person, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (1995) (Count II) (R. 1-3).x
Prior to trial, the court partially granted defendant's motion in
limine, allowing initials written on the casing of a bullet
loaded in a gun found in defendant's home, but excluding evidence
that the initials were those of defendant's former probation
officer (R. 77, 393-402).

Following a jury trial, defendant was

convicted of the lesser included offense of Count I, possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and of Count II
(R. 3 03).

The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive

zero-to-five year terms (R. 303-04).

1

On the State's motion

The information correctly sets out the charge in the
language of section 76-10-503(1), to wit: defendant had
previously been convicted of a crime of violence, a third degree
felony. However, the information incorrectly identifies the
offense as a violation of subsection 2, a second degree felony.
The charge was correctly submitted to the jury pursuant to
subsection (1) (R. 350).
3

following the sentencing, the court dismissed the habitual
criminal penalty enhancement (R. 390).
STATEMENT QF FACTS
On the morning of January 17, 1995, Layton City Police
Officer Robert Price and Detective Alan Swanson went to
defendant's residence in Roy, Utah, to serve an arrest warrant on
charges unrelated to the instant case (R. 492-93, 501-02, 530).
Defendant's mother, Lavonda Robins, answered the door and
directed the officers to defendant's bedroom, located in the
basement (R. 494, 503, 513, 531). Upon identifying themselves
and then entering, both officers saw a woman, Jill Crittenden,2
and defendant in bed together.

Crittenden immediately grabbed a

syringe, reached over defendant and put the syringe in a dresser
drawer next to defendant (R. 494-95, 503-04).

Defendant and

Crittenden were arrested and given Miranda warnings (R. 504). 3
Defendant said that he understood his rights and that he was
willing to speak to the officers (R. 505). Defendant said that
he did not know of any drugs in the room, even though Crittenden
had just grabbed a syringe and two or three more were in plain
sight on the night stand next to Crittenden's side of the bed (R.

2

The names "Crittenden" and "Teeter" are used
interchangeably throughout the trial. "Teeter" is Crittenden's
maiden name (R. 632).
3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463, 886 S. Ct. 1602

(1966) .
4

505-06) . However, defendant admitted that he and Crittenden had
shot up a little methamphetamine and used a little marijuana the
night before (R. 509). Because drug matters were not within
their special province, Detective Swanson called the Weber-Morgan
County Strike Force for assistance (R. 510).
Also, concerned about their safety, the officers looked
around the room and saw a box of .357 Magnum rounds on top of a
dresser and a single .380 round on top of a speaker (R. 495-96,
507-08).

When asked if there was a gun in the room, defendant

hesitated and then answered, "No" (R. 508). When asked about the
bullets, defendant first said there might be a gun in the room,
but that he did not know where it was (R. 508-09).

Eventually,

defendant said that, although he was not sure, it might be in one
of the dresser drawers, to which he directed the officers'
attention (R. 510). Checking a drawer, Officer Swanson found a
loaded .357 revolver, along with some small plastic baggies, a
container of inositol and a smoking pipe (R. 510-12).
Lieutenant Chris Zimmerman of the Ogden City Police
Department, Commander of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike
Force,4 dispatched Roy City Police Officer Michael Elliott to
defendant's residence and then proceeded to defendant's residence
himself (R. 528-30, 574-75, 581). Coincidentally, Lieutenant
4

At the time of the events at issue Lieutenant
Zimmerman was a sergeant and the field supervisor of the Strike
Force (R. 575).
5

Zimmerman had obtained a search warrant for defendant's premises,
which he had intended to serve later that day.

The warrant was

based on background intelligence and controlled "buys" from
Crittenden, known to be living with defendant and followed to
defendant's residence during the buys (R. 579-80) .5
Pursuant to the warrant, Lieutenant Zimmerman and Officer
Elliott searched defendant's room (R. 530-31).

Examining the

.357 revolver, Officer Elliot found it loaded and ready to fire
with three regular bullets and two miniature buckshot cartridges
(R. 533). Lieutenant Zimmerman discovered that one of the
buckshot cartridges had the name "K. Allen" written on it (R.
583).

Officer Elliott also confirmed the discovery of a couple

of baggies, the container of inositol and a pipe in the same
drawer (R. 536-37).

Learning in the course of the search that

defendant was a restricted person, Officer Elliott also took the
following items from the same drawer: (1) a prescription bottle
for folic acid bearing defendant's name; (2) a Blockbuster video
card with defendant's name on it; (3) a blue paper containing a
substantial list of telephone numbers; (4) a work order for
defendant's black Thunderbird; (5) a small calculator; and (6) a

5

Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from the
defendant's premises pursuant to the warrant, on the ground that
the supporting affidavit, drafted by Lieutenant Zimmerman, lacked
probable cause and because officers could not have relied upon
the warrant in good faith (Motion to Suppress, R. 50-51).
Following a hearing, the motion was denied (R. 69).
6

letter dated December 2, 1993 from the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation addressed to defendant (R. 546-48).
Continuing their search, the officers found the rest of the
room littered with drug paraphernalia and a small amount of
drugs.

In the same dresser, they found three small sets of

scales, one of which contained a white powdery substance and the
other a little residue (R. 545, 588-89).

A large set of triple

beam scales was also found in the dresser (R. 548).
In a toolbox containing tools engraved with defendant's
initials, Officer Elliott found a ziplock baggie containing other
such baggies (535-36, 583-84).
In a fanny pack they found a black comb such as a man might
use, a case containing four or five Valium, a film canister with
.? white powdery substance, some small, clean ziplocked baggies, a
couple of lighters, and a small velvet bag containing a spoon
that appeared to contain methamphetamine residue, a Brillo pad,
some Q-tips, and a glass test tube in which there was a white
powdery substance which had been burned (R. 538-40, 587) .
In what appeared to be a woman's jacket hanging on the end
of the bed, Lieutenant Zimmerman found two or three clean baggies
and a knife inscribed with the name "Jill" (R. 541-42, 588) .
On the nightstand from which Crittenden had grabbed the
syringe half full of a brown liquid, the officers also found
another spoon and Q-tip and more small baggies, three electronic
7

organizers, two address books, two of which bore the name
"Michael" and a memo notebook (R. 541-44).

In the nightstand

they found a Sega Game Gear cartridge containing what appeared to
be four to five grams of marijuana and about three grams of
methamphetamine (R. 545-46).

David Murdock, chemist at the Utah

State Crime Laboratory, confirmed that one of the substances was
methamphetamine, which appeared to have been clandestinely
produced (R. 625-31).
Both officers testified that certain items seized were
evidence of intent to distribute:

inositol, used as a cutting

agent for methamphetamine to increase its quantity (R. 537, 560,
586, 591), electronic organizers and address books for the names
of buyers (R. 542-43, 564, 598-99), scales (R. 561, 588-89), and
clean baggies (R. 568-69, 585, 591, 593). Taking the evidence as
a whole, Lieutenant Zimmerman believed the methamphetamine seized
was intended for sale (R. 599) , though on cross examination both
he and Officer Elliott acknowledged that some of the evidence
also indicated possession for use (R. 555-59, 568, 603-05).
Defendant also elicited some testimony suggesting that evidence
of distribution was attributable to Crittenden and not to
defendant.6

6

Particularly, defendant elicited that the knife with
the baggies was inscribed with the name "Jill," and that it came
from what appeared to be a woman's coat (R. 557); the fanny pack
was too small for defendant (R. 558-59); the address books could
have been Crittenden's (R. 564); and the controlled buys were
8

In further support of the drug charge, Zimmerman testified
that when he interviewed Crittenden following a subsequent drug
bust in April, 1995, some three months after the events of this
case, she stated that, with respect to drugs in this case,
defendant was selling drugs and that she was delivering for him
(R. 559-600, 639, 759-61).
Called by the prosecution, Crittenden admitted that in
connection with this criminal episode, for which she was
ultimately convicted of possession and distribution of controlled
substances, she had also negotiated with undercover agents for
the sale of drugs and a firearm that belonged to defendant (R.
633-34) . That negotiation was confirmed by Michelle Hernandez, a
reserve officer with the Ogden City Police Department, working
undercover on the controlled buys from Crittenden in this case
(R. 740-43) . Crittenden said she got the bullets for the gun
from a Johnny Morrell and took them to defendant's home, but that
she never loaded them into the .357 revolver nor knew how they
got into the gun (R. 635-36).
Kim Allen, District Supervisor for Adult Probation and
Parole ("AP&P), testified, without objection, that he had known
defendant for about fifteen years and that he also knew
Crittenden, though he had not dealt with her professionally (R.

both made with Crittenden and not defendant (R. 601-02, 606).
9

660-61).

On January 19, 1995, two days after defendant's arrest,

Allen visited defendant in jail (R. 661).

In their conversation,

defendant claimed that he was not responsible for writing Allen's
name on the .357 cartridge.

Defendant claimed that someone else

had written Allen's name on the .380 cartridge, and he believed
that the Strike Force was lying (R. 663-64, 668, 746-47).
Defendant also admitted that he and Crittenden had "fallen off
the wagon," but denied that either Crittenden or he were dealing
drugs (R. 664-65).
In attempting to explain why defendant might have been angry
at him, Allen testified that on a previous occasion he assisted
the Strike Force on a search of defendant's house which resulted
in the recovery of some stolen snow blowers (R. 683).
moved for a mistrial.

Defendant

The trial court denied the motion and gave

the jury a curative instruction (R. 683-89).

Thereafter, on

rebuttal, Allen testified, again without objection, that
defendant admitted that he had been a collection agent for drug
dealers in the past and that he had not used a firearm in making
his collection rounds, but rather needed only to raise his voice
because "his reputation [for being assaultive] preceded him" (R.
747) .
In support of the habitual criminal and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a convicted persons charges ("felon in
possession"), the prosecution presented evidence that defendant

10

had been convicted and committed to prison on a second degree
felony forgery and four third degree felonies, to wit: attempted
forgery, burglary, possession of a controlled substance, and
assault by a prisoner (R. 519-26, 573, 657-59).

The court also

instructed the jury that burglary and assault by a prisoner are
crimes of violence (Jury Instruction #24, R. 351).
Defendant's stepfather, Neil Robins, who no longer lived
with defendant's mother, testified for the defense.

He stated

that the gun belonged to him and that he had left it on a shelf
in an upstairs bedroom (R. 696-700).
Defendant also testified.

He denied putting the .357

revolver in his dresser or knowing it was there (R. 724-25) .

He

denied having told Detective Swanson that he had shot up
methamphetamine the night before or directing Swanson to the gun
(R. 726-3 0).

He denied that any of the drugs found in his room

were his (R. 724) .7 With respect to his conversation with Allen,
defendant denied everything except that he did not put Allen's
name on the cartridge and that he had been using drugs (R. 73 032).

Defendant claimed that Allen was his friend (R. 732-33).

7

On cross examination, Crittenden also denied that any
of the drugs, paraphernalia or the .357 revolver belonged to
defendant and that all drug evidence was attributable to her (R.
642-47) .
11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The challenged evidence, a cartridge bearing the name of
defendant's former parole supervisor, was properly admitted to
show that defendant, and not his living companion, had possession
of a firearm located in a bedroom they both shared.

After

finding the evidence highly probative, the trial court correctly
weighed probativeness against the prejudice associated with the
cartridge and reasonably ruled the evidence admissible by
forbidding reference to the parole officer-parolee relationship
suggested by the evidence.
Even if there was any error in admitting the cartridge, it
was harmless because defendant failed to object to evidence
plainly suggesting his relationship with his parole officer when
it was introduced at trial and because evidence of defendant's
prior conviction of a crime of violence was necessarily
admissible to prove an element of the felon in possession charge.
POINT IJ
Because defendant's motion for a mistrial was based on his
parole officer's reference to defendant's connection to stolen
snow blowers, and not on any revelation that the witness had been
his parole officer, defendant's argument he was prejudiced by the
revelation of the relationship has been waived.

Any prejudice

associated with the reference to the snow blowers was cured by an
12

appropriate instruction to the jury.

Any prejudice was further

vitiated by the introduction of other substantial evidence, not
objected to, of defendant's criminal background and assaultive
nature, and by overwhelming evidence of guilt.

POINT III
Defendant's becoming silent occured in a context suggesting
his protectiveness of a companion, rather than a wish to conceal
his guilt.

Therefore, a police officer's testimony regarding

defendant's post-arrest silence is only an ambiguous comment on
the right to silence.

Even if the testimony constituted improper

comment on defendant's post-arrest silence, it was not
prejudicial.

The comment was isolated and not later referenced

in closing argument.

Most significantly, the evidence of

defendant's guilt was overwhelming.
The prosecutor's cross examination of a minor witness
through leading questions referencing a prior meeting between the
witness and the prosecutor did not amount to the prosecutor's
giving testimony in violation of defendant's right to
confrontation.

Unlike witnesses who refuse to respond to

questions, thus making it impossible for a defendant to cross
examine them, the witness in this case was responsive.

Further,

since the prosecutor was a witness to the relevant conversation,
he too was subject to cross examination.

13

AUGMENT
PPJNT J
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING A CARTRIDGE ON WHICH THE NAME
OF DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER WAS WRITTEN. ANY ERROR
IN THE COURT'S RULING IS HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT
FAILED TO TIMELY OBJECT TO EVIDENCE COMPARABLE TO THE
ADMITTED EVIDENCE
A.

The Trial Court Properly Balanced the Probative
Value of the Evidence Against its Potential for
Unfair Prejudice and Did Not Abuse its Discretion
in Crafting a Ruling that Prohibited the Introduction
of Prejudicial Testimony While Admitting Highly
Probative Evidence.

In this case defense counsel filed a motion in limine (R.
77), arguing that the cartridge with the name "K. Allen" written
on it should be excluded from the evidence (Hearing on motion in
limine, R. 393-402, attached at Addendum B ) .

Specifically,

counsel argued that the cartridge had limited relevance because
the prosecution needed only to prove that defendant, a restricted
person, was in possession of the gun.

However, counsel argued,

the prejudice was extreme because the cartridge plainly suggested
that defendant was intending to use deadly force on his probation
officer (R. 394-97).
the same argument.

On appeal, defendant makes substantially
Appellant's Br. at 11-14.

Although defendant

does not explicitly state as much, it is apparent that rules 4 03
and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, govern the analysis of the
issues raised.

Applying those provisions and the relevant case

law to the facts, defendant's arguments fail.
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1.

The Law.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
exclusion.

Rule*404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not

State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994).

&££ also State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982) (rule
"has syntax at odds with its substance"); State v. O'Neil. 848
P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989).

But see

State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) ("evidence of
other crimes is generally inadmissible").

"Prior bad act

evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being
offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted
in conformity with that character."

O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700.

"The admission of evidence under Rule 4 04 is a question of
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness."

State

v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) (citing O'Neil.
848 P.2d at 698).

"'However, the trial court's subsidiary

factual determinations should be given deference by the appellate
court and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous.'" Id.
(quoting O'Neil. at 698-99) .
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2.

The Trial Court did not Err in Admitting the Cartridge
to Show Knowledge and Intent.

On appeal defendant argues that the only real purpose for
introducing the cartridge was to show that defendant had
previously been convicted of violent crimes and that he had an
intention to commit another such crime.

Appellant's Br. at 13.

That argument does little justice to the genuine relevance and
significance of the cartridge, apart from any prejudice attached
to it.

£££ State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987)

("To give meaning to the policy embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence
of other crimes must be reasonably necessary and highly probative
of a material issue.1').
The prosecutor informed the court that there were two people
in the room when the .357 was discovered, defendant and
Crittenden (R. 397). As the prosecutor plainly foresaw, and the
subsequent trial proceedings make perfectly clear, the defense to
the felon in possession charge was based largely on the
possibility that Crittenden, and not defendant, had possession of
the revolver, evidenced by her attempts at selling the weapon (R.
642-47, 724-25, 790). Therefore, any evidence linking defendant,
and not Crittenden, to the cartridge was extremely probative.
The prosecutor supplied that link, informing the court that "this
defendant is the only person who has any connection to Kim Allen"
(R. 397), and that as far as he knew, Crittenden had never been
on parole prior to this incident (R. 398-99).
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On these facts, unrebutted by defendant,8 it is apparent
that the trial court was correct in stating:

"If there's a

serious issue concerning whether there -- the gun is his or not
his, then it seems to me that the probative value of this is
fairly significant (R. 400).
3.

The Trial Court's Carefully Tailored Ruling Allowed
the Admission of Evidence that was not More
Prejudicial than it was Probative.

Defendant asserts error in the trial court's ruling by
repeatedly arguing that its error derives from the prejudicial
effect of the parolee-parole relationship, which signals
defendant's having committed prior crimes.

This claim seems to

overlook precisely the prejudicial component that the trial court
excluded from evidence:
THE COURT: If there's a serious issue concerning
whether there -- the gun is his or not his, then it
seems to me that the probative value of this is fairly
significant. I agree with Mr. Hutchison's analysis,
that's a more devastating part of that when you think
back to the nature of the relationship between Mr.
Allen and the -- and the defendant. I would therefore
instruct and grant the motion in limine at least to
this extent: That the State can talk about the fact
that they are acquainted, they've had associations in
the past, and that the defendant might have reason to
be angry at Kim Allen. That there might be some

8

Defendant fails to marshal any of the abovereferenced evidence that the prosecutor presented in opposition
to defendant's motion, and on which it relied, in finding that
the evidence was highly probative. *[A]s a preliminary matter,
defendant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as
found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even, viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." State
v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 (Utah App. 1994) (citations
omitted).
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acrimony if indeed that's the case. And I don't know
whether that's the case of not. But that they are not
to reference the fact that the relationship arose out
of a parole officer-parolee relationship.
(R. 400-01).
Contrary also to defendant's assertion, the trial court made
findings as to prejudice under rule 403.

Rule 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.
rule.

Rule 403, like 404(b) is an

x

inclusionary'

State v. Lindaren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996).

"[Rule 403] presumes the admission of all relevant evidence
except where the evidence has

x

an unusual propensity to unfairly

prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury."

Id. (quoting State v.

Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)).

"Moreover, the fact

that evidence is prejudicial does not, by itself, render that
evidence inadmissible.

Rather,

x

[i]f the evidence is prejudicial

but is at least equally probative[,] . . .
admissible.'"

it is properly

State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah

App. 1996) (quoting State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App.
1991).
In balancing the probative value of rule 4 04(b) evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court should
consider certain factors, such as identified in Shickles:
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(1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, (2) the similarities between the crimes, (3) the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, (4) the
need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative proof, and
(6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury
to overmastering hostility.

Shickles. 760 P.2d at 295.

Applying the Shickles factors, to the extent they are
relevant, the trial court's admission of the cartridge was not an
abuse of discretion.

First, the "crime" of being associated with

Kim Allen, defendant's former parole supervisor, is undisputed.
Nor does defendant challenge on appeal that defendant was not
responsible for writing Allen's name on the cartridge.9

See

State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Utah 1977) (admitting
evidence of prior crimes for which the defendant had not been
convicted to show intent).
Second, it is unclear how long it had been since defendant
wrote Allen's name on the cartridge.

However, Allen testified

that defendant told him the name had been applied to the bullet
at a party (R. 746). The character of this testimony, plus
Crittenden's admission that she had gotten the bullets from
Morrell and taken them "home," plainly referring to defendant's
house (R. 635), suggests that this series of events was fairly
9

Although defendant denied that he had written Allen's
name on the cartridge, he admitted that he knew Allen's name had
been applied to a .380 cartridge (R. 730, 732).
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recent.

Moreover, while it is also unclear how long prior to

this incident defendant was supervised by Allen, there is no
doubt that there relationship was ongoing.

In testifying why

defendant might have been upset with him, Allen noted that he had
accompanied police to defendant's house only one month before his
arrest in this case (R. 683). O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (evidence
of conviction three years previous not excessive); State v.
Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990) (evidence of robbery
one month prior properly admitted).
Third, as noted above, the need for the evidence was great.
The prosecutor accurately foresaw that defendant's principal
defense to the felon in possession charge was that Crittenden,
and not defendant, had possession of the gun (R. 397-98).

The

cartridge bearing the name of defendant's, not Crittenden's,
former parole supervisor was necessary to rebut that defense.
The prosecutor was not required to undercut the State's case even
though there was alternative evidence connecting defendant to the
weapon.
Finally, the jury would not likely have been roused to
"overmastering hostility" by the admission of the challenged
evidence.

As discussed below, the jury would necessarily learn

that defendant had previously been convicted of other felony
offenses, including crimes of violence.

Moreover, by excluding

reference to the parole officer-parolee relationship, the trial
20

court excised a significant prejudicial component associated with
the cartridge.

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in granting defendant's motion in limine by
conditionally admitting the cartridge.
B.

Any Error in Admitting the Cartridge was Harmless
Because Defendant Failed to Object to Evidence Plainly
Suggesting his Relationship with His Parole Officer
When it wfrg Xntrp^ced frt Tri»l »n£ Because Evidence
of Defendant's Prior Conviction of a Crime of Violence
was Necessarily Admissible to Prove an Element of the
Qffenge.

In any event, any error in the court's ruling allowing the
admission of the cartridge with the condition : ..at no reference
be made to the parole officer-parolee relationship was, at most
harmless.10

See State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App.

1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (finding harmless
any possible error in allowing the admission of potentially
prejudicial testimony when defendant failed to object to other
testimony having substantially the same import).

10

In declining to present a separate discussion in
support of the trial court's ruling, the State does not suggest
that the ruling was unsound. Rather, such argument is
unnecessary in the light of defendant's significant procedural
failures and the patent harmlessness of any error. Indeed, the
State assumes that the obvious relevance of the writing on the
bullet, particularly in light of the contested issue of
possession, makes plain that the court's conditional ruling was
not an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ramirez, 299 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7, 8-9 (Utah App. 1996) (evidence of prior criminal activity
properly admitted under rules
403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, to show knowledge and
intent, considering the similarity in prior criminal conduct, the
need for the evidence, and its limited potential for inflaming
the jury).
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On direct examination Kim Allen testified that he was the
District Supervisor for AP&P, that he had known defendant for
about fifteen years, that at defendant's request he visited
defendant in jail, that defendant confessed that he had "falien
off the wagon," but denied that he had been dealing drugs or was
responsible for the writing on the cartridge (R. 660-65).

It is

apparent from Allen's and defendant's conversation that the jury
would readily have inferred that the parole officer-parolee
relationship existed between Allen and defendant.
defendant did not object to Allen's testimony.

However,

Indeed, on cross

examination defense counsel himself elicited that this
conversation took place about a year after defendant had gotten
"off parole" (R. 669). Further, Allen testified on rebuttal,
again without objection, that defendant admitted that he had been
a collection agent for drug dealers in the past and that he had
not used a firearm in making his collection rounds, but rather
needed only to raise his voice because "his reputation [for being
assaultive] preceded him" (R. 747).
Additionally, the State was required to prove that defendant
had previously been convicted of "any crime of violence," in
order to convict defendant of being a felon in possession.11
11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995), providing for the
offense of being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon,
states:
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime
22

Evidence of defendant's having committed both a burglary and an
assault as a prisoner was admitted without objection (R. 524-26,
657-59).

The jury was instructed on the required elements of the

offense in the language of the statute, and further, that
burglary and assault by a prisoner were crimes of violence (R.
349-51).
In sum, because defendant failed to object to evidence
plainly suggesting his relationship with his parole officer, his
prior criminal activities and assaultive nature and because
evidence of defendant's prior conviction of a crime of violence
was necessarily admissible to prove an element of the offense,
any error in the trial court's ruling was harmless.

of violence under the laws of the United States, this
state, or any other state, government, or country, or
who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who
has been declared mentally incompetent may not own or
have in his possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part,
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon
is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
23

POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CHALLENGE IN THE TRIAL
COURT. ALSO, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT GAVE THE JURY
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS, AND BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S PAROLEE-PAROLE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP TO KIM
ALLEN AND DEFENDANT'S OTHER BAD ACTS HAD PREVIOUSLY
BEEN UNCOVERED, AND BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF GUILT WAS
OVERWHELMING, NO PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE
INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY
A.

Factual Background.

Kim Allen first testified to his long-standing acquaintance
with defendant and his visit with defendant about a year after
defendant had been off parole on the first day of trial, December
14, 1995 (R. 406, 660-70).

In accordance with the court's ruling

on the motion in limine, the prosecutor called Allen the
following day to ask him about why defendant might have been
upset with him:12
MR. HEWARD: All right. A couple of things that I
didn't ask you yesterday. Specifically, have you in
your job, your experience, do you regularly deal with
meth users and sellers?
MR. ALLEN: Yes, I do.

12

Defendant argues that the prosecution's only purpose
in questioning Allen at this point was to show the jury that
defendant was angry with Allen, a fact unnecessary to prove any
element of the felon in possession charge. Appellant's Br. at
16. However, in conditionally granting the motion in limine, the
trial court expressly allowed the prosecution to inquire about
whether there might be any acrimony between the two men (R. 4 00).
Defendant did not object to this ruling. It is apparent that the
court allowed this line of questioning because the existence of
acrimony would help explain why defendant might have written
Allen's name on the cartridge. See State v. Morgar>r 813 P.2d
1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (finding no error or violation of
rule 4 04, Utah Rules of Evidence, in the admission of other bad
acts inflicted on a nonparty because "the prosecutor is entitled
to paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in
question transpired, and citing numerous cases in support).
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MR. HEWARD: And is it common for you to see people who
are using and selling meth to become extremely
paranoid?
MR. ALLEN: Yes, that's one of the characteristics.
It's one of the problems with meth.
MR. HEWARD: All right. Based on that, when you found
out that there was a bullet recovered with your name on
it in a search warrant of Mr. Morrison's home, did that
cause you concern?
MR. ALLEN: Yes, it did.
MR. HEWARD: Did you stop and think abut anything that
could occurred in the time period immediately prior to
this that could have caused him -MR. ALLEN: Yes.
MR. HEWARD:

-- to be upset with you?

MR. ALLEN: Yes, I did.
MR. HEWARD: What would that have been?
MR. ALLEN: Probably, oh, maybe a month prior to Mike's
arrest, I'd been working late and was notified over the
radio that the Strike Force needed some assistance on a
search at Mike Morrison's house and was wondering if I
knew where he lived and if I'd been there. I told
them, yeah, I knew the family well. So I assisted Mike
Ashment and a couple of deputies from Davis County. We
went to Mike's home, recovered some stolen property,
stolen snow blowers from his place, and then Mike took
us over to another place and got another stolen snow
blower. So I figure maybe that got him upset with me.
(R. 682-83).
B«

Defendant Failed to Preserve in the Trial Court his
Challenge on Appeal that Allen's Testimony
Prejudicially Signaled His Relationship with his
Parole Officer in Violation of the Ruling on the
Motion in Limine,

Defendant principally argues that Allen's testimony
prejudicially signaled his relationship with his parole officer,
in violation of the court's ruling on the motion in limine
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expressly precluding reference to that relationship.
Br. at 14-18.

Appellant's

However, by failing to preserve this particular

objection in the course of moving for a mistrial, defendant has
waived this aspect of his challenge to the court's denial of his
motion.
11

[0] rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an

issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional
circumstances or plain error."

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,

1311 (Utah 1987); Price. 837 P.2d at 580-01 (Utah App. 1992).
The rationale for this rule was stated by this Court in State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993):
The purpose of requiring a properly presented objection
is to 'put[] the judge on notice of the asserted error
and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time
in the course of the proceeding.' Broberg v. Hess, 782
P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court is
considered 'the proper forum in which to commence
thoughtful and probing analysis' of issues. State v.
Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).
Id. at 359-60.
Immediately following Allen's testimony, defendant requested
a side bar conference (R. 683). 13

Out of the hearing of the jury

defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the testimony
had referenced stolen snow blowers, evidence of other uncharged
crime, and was therefore prejudicial (R. 684). The prosecutor
argued that the testimony gave evidence of motive and that in his
13

The entire colloquy bearing on defendant's motion
for a mistrial, including the court's curative instruction, is
attached at Addendum C.
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questions he had stayed strictly away from the issue of the
excluded relationship (R. 684) . In response, defendant again
argued that he was entitled to a mistrial because the testimony
had nullified the court's ruling on the motion in limine by
indicating crimes defendant had not even been convicted of,
including receiving stolen property (R. 6 85) . The trial court
thought the testimony had only limited relevance to motive, but
considered reference to the snow blowers irrelevant and highly
prejudicial, though not warranting a mistrial (R. 685-87).

After

the parties concluded that charges relating to the snow blowers
had been dismissed, the trial court suggested a curative
instruction, informing the jury that charges had been filed and
then dismissed, that testimony as to the snow blowers was
irrelevant and that they should disregard it (R. 688-87).
Defendant agreed with the court that the instruction should be
given immediately, though he did not withdraw his motion (R.
688).

Attempting to remedy what it thought prejudicial, the

court instructed the jury:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, quite
frequently during the course of a trial, things will
come up unexpectedly which really shouldn't come to
your attention. There has been some testimony that -that the defendant in this case was involved with some
stolen snow blowers.
Now, that hasn't got anything at all to do with
this case and I'm instructing you specifically that
you're to completely disregard it. And just to kind of
back up and fortify the importance of not considering
it, the Court's instructing you that charges were filed
and dismissed.
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So that's not something that, in fairness, you
ought to consider when you're determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant in this case.
(R. 689).
It is apparent that defense counsel at trial did not believe
that the prejudice that flowed from Allen's testimony grew from
any suggestion of the excluded relationship beyond that which had
already come to light during the previous day's testimony, or
that the court's ruling on the motion in limine had been violated
by reference to the excluded relationship.

Rather, defendant's

motion plainly went only the prejudicial reference to the stolen
snow blowers.

Because defendant failed to alert the trial court

to an allegation of prejudice related to the excluded
relationship, thereby giving the court an opportunity to consider
the matter and craft a different curative instruction,
defendant's challenge has been waived for appeal.

However, even

considering defendant's claim, it lacks merit because the jury
was instructed at the time of the testimony, and again when it
retired, to disregard reference to the snow blowers, and because
the testimony was not prejudicial in the context of the entire
body of evidence.
C.
Any Prejudice Relating to Allen's Testimony was
Either Cured by the Jury Instructions or Failed to
Warrant a Mistrial in the Context of All the Evidence.
*\A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for
a mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion.

R^gmygsen v. Shfrrfrpata, 895 P.2d 391,
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3 94 (Utah App. 1995) . A defendant has the burden of persuading
this court that the conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome
of the trial.
1991)."

State v. Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah App.

Price. 909 P.2d at 262.

Discussing the prejudice necessary to sustain a motion for a
mistrial, the Court in Burk stated that [e]vidence is unfairly
prejudicial,
if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the
trial by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes
its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to
base its decision on something other than the
established propositions of the case.
839 P.2d at 883 (citing Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst..
605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted), overruled
on other grounds. MgFarl&nfl v. Skaggg COS., Inc./ 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984)).
In Burk. a witness testified that she knew the defendant had
"done this."

Id. at 882.

The trial court sustained the

defendant's objection and ordered the statement stricken.

Id.

The same witness also testified that the defendant's sister-inlaw had told her that the defendant "was going to cut her up."
Id.

The defendant asked that the jury be excused and moved for a

mistrial on the grounds that such testimony was prejudicial and
could not be cured by an appropriate instruction.

The trial

court denied the motion, but instructed the jury to disregard the
witness's statements.

Id.

Relying on the assumption that the
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jury was conscientious in following instructions, this Court held
that the defendant had not been unduly prejudiced, based on the
lower court's curative instructions and on the defendant's
failure to show that the statements were so prejudicial as to
deny him a fair trial.

Id. at 883. As a further reason for

holding the lower court had not abused its discretion, the Court
noted

that the defendant had failed to object to substantially

equivalent testimony of the defendant's prior threats to other
witnesses.

Id. at 883-84.

See also State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d

1232, 1242-44 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 476
(1993) (finding mistrial unwarranted where the

court informed

the jury that testimony was inadmissible, incredible and
suggested an insupportable view of the offense).
In this case the trial court informed the jury that charges
related to the snow blowers had been dismissed, that reference to
them was irrelevant and that they should disregard the reference
(R. 689). Further, the court's written instructions twice
informed the jury that it was not to consider stricken evidence
(See Jury instructions #8 and #16, R. 335, 343).
Further, the reference to stolen snow blowers or allusion to
the excluded relationship could not have prejudiced defendant,
considering the evidence as a whole.

First, Allen merely stated

that he was asked by police officers if he knew defendant and
that he accompanied them on a search of defendant's home (R.
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683).

From this statement it is not at all clear that Allen

exposed the parole officer-parolee relationship between defendant
and him.

In any event, their relationship was no more exposed by

this testimony than it was when Allen testified earlier, without
objection, that he, a parole officer, had known defendant for
fifteen years and that defendant had been on parole (R. 660-69) .
Second, as discussed above, Allen's statements only disclosed
about defendant's criminal background what the jury would
necessarily discover in hearing evidence of defendant's prior
violent, criminal offenses, offered to prove him a felon in
possession.

Thus, references to dismissed charges related to

stolen snow blowers were trivial and cumulative evidence of
defendant's criminal disposition, evidence of which was properly
admitted.

Br. at 22-23.

Most importantly, evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming.

See State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App.), cert,

denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (mere allegation of prejudice
in failing to sever charges insufficient for reversal in light
overwhelming evidence of guilt on each charge).

In response to

whether there was a gun in the room, defendant directed Detective
Swanson to his dresser (R. 510). The .357 revolver was found in
a drawer of that dresser containing defendant's personal effects
and papers (R. 546-48) . Crittenden admitted that she neither
loaded the gun nor knew how the bullets got into the gun (R. 63531

36).

Even though defendant took the stand, he offered no

explanation about how the gun got from the upstairs bedroom,
where his step father claimed he had left it, to defendant's
dresser drawer in his bedroom (R. 696-700).

Defendant's

conviction for two crimes of violence was undisputed (R. 525,
573, 658-59).

The evidence was also overwhelming on the drug

possession conviction.14

Defendant told Detective Swanson that

he had shot up with methamphetamine and used a little marijuana
the night before the search (R. 509). Defendant admitted to
Allen that he had "fallen off the wagon" and that he needed to
"get himself back together again" (R. 665). Defendant's bedroom
was littered throughout with drugs and paraphernalia.
Particularly, syringes were observed on the nightstand and
methamphetamine and marijuana were found in the nightstand (R.
505-06, 545-46).

14

Insofar as possession is an element of both the drug
and weapons charges, the prosecution was only required to show
that defendant had constructive possession. As the jury was
instructed, constructive possession does not require actual
possession, but only a right to control the thing at issue, which
might be shared by more than one person (Jury instructions #27
and #28, R. 353-54). Thus, the evidence of defendant's
possession, even if shared with Crittenden, assumes even greater
proportions and virtually nullifies the defense. See State v.
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (constructive
possession requires "there [] be a nexus between the accused and
the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused
had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over the drug")(citing State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985)).
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In sum, any error in denying defendant's motion for a
mistrial was harmless considering that comparably prejudicial
evidence was properly admitted without objection and evidence of
defendant's guilt was overwhelming.
POINT III
ANY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN COMMENTING ON
DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST SILENCE WAS HARMLESS, AND THERE
WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CONFRONTING A
HOSTILE WITNESS WHO DENIED CERTAIN EVENTS
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor inappropriately
commented on defendant's post-arrest silence in the course of
questioning two of the State's witnesses.

Acknowledging that

trial counsel failed to object, he argues that the questioning
constituted plain error entitling him to a reversal of his
conviction.
"To establish plain error, a party must show the following:
(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court; and (3) the error was harmful, or in other
words, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the complaining party."

State v.

Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v.
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).

"The claim of plain

error fails if any one of these requirements is not shown."
(citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209).
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A.

Any Error from Comment on Defendant's Post-Arrest
Silgnge JB Hfrrmlegg Bgypnd ^ figagpn^ble Dpyfrt»

The prosecutor elicited from Officer Price that following
defendant's arrest and the giving of Miranda warnings, defendant
initially appeared willing to talk to him (Price) (R. 498, 50405).

The prosecutor then asked if Crittenden did anything to

stop defendant from talking, and Officer Price stated that
defendant stopped talking in response to Crittenden's twice
telling defendant to shut up (R. 498-99) .

Later, the prosecutor

also elicited from Crittenden that she told defendant to shut up
upon advice from her lawyer, with whom she was then on the
telephone (R. 648-49) .15
It is well-established that comments about a defendant's
remaining silent after an arrest are frowned upon and may be
grounds for reversal.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20, 96 S.

Ct. 2242, 2245-46 (1976); State v. Wiswell. 639 P.2d 146, 147
(Utah 1981); State v. Sorrels. 642 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1982) (per
curiam); Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057.
Testimony elicited from Crittenden is not subject to the
prohibition against prosecutorial comment on the right to silence
because that testimony does not indicate that defendant responded
to Crittenden's direction to keep quiet.

See United States v.

Warren. 578 F.2d 1058, 1072-73 (1978), modified by 612 F.2d 887

15

The transcript of the colloquies with Officer Price
and Crittenden are attached at Addendum D.
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(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 446 U.S. 956, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980)
(holding that testimony of federal agent that a codefendant
requested other codefendants remain silent was not improper
comment on the right to silence absent the defendant's reaction
to the advice).
The State recognizes that Officer Price's testimony might be
regarded as improper comment on defendant's right to silence.
However, the context in which the reference was made does not
comport with the policy forbidding improper comment, to wit:
protecting a defendant from the negative inferences which may be
drawn from necessarily "ambiguous" silence.
at 616-18, 96 S. Ct. at 2244-45.

See Doyle, 426 U.S.

In this case defendant's

silence at Crittenden's behest might well be recognized, not as
an attempt to hide his guilt, but to protect Crittenden.
the alleged impropriety is ambiguous.

Thus,

However, even if the Court

finds this testimony to be improper comment, defendant has failed
to show that the error was harmful.
In evaluating whether the prosecutor's reference to
defendant's post-arrest silence prejudiced defendant, the court
may consider the following factors:

M l ) whether the jury would

'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring to
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and
(4) whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any
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adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify."
Reyes. 861 P.2d at 1057 (citing State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546,
554-55 (Utah 1987) ) .
Applying this test it is apparent that defendant was not
prejudiced by Officer Price's testimony.

Although the reference

to defendant's being unwilling to talk would naturally have been
recognized as a comment referring to defendant's silence, the
comment was isolated and not even referred to in closing
argument.

See Reyes. 861 P.2d at 1056-57 (finding that a

similarly distinctive comment was isolated under the Tillman
factors).

No curative instruction was given, but this factor

must be tempered with the fact that defendant did not object,
thereby depriving the trial court of an opportunity to rectify
any error.

£jL. State v. Chyjgtpfferscn/ 793 P.2d 944, (Utah App.

1990) (affirming conviction in spite of prosecutor's failure to
inform opposing counsel of the defendant's exculpatory statement,
where the defendant moved only to dismiss rather than giving
trial court opportunity to mitigate the damage by continuing the
trial or excluding unanticipated testimony); but see Reyes, 861
P.2d at 1057 (finding inadequate trial court's curative
instruction in case where no objection was made at the time of
the improper comment).
Most significant, however, is the overwhelming evidence of
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defendant's guilt, as discussed above. Appellee's Br. at 31-32.
See State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237-38 (Utah App. 1989)
(finding prosecutorial inquiry into codefendant's post-arrest
silence, timely objected to, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
based on the isolatedness of comment, overwhelming evidence and
curative instruction).

Indeed, it would not appear that the

proscription against comment on the right to silence from Doyle
and its progeny have much relevance to a case in which defendant
led police officers to evidence more than sufficient to convict
him before he invoked his right to silence.

In any case, given

the massive evidence of defendant's guilt, the outcome in this
case would not have been different even if the comment had not
been made.
B.

There was no Prosecutorial Misconduct in Confronting
a Hostile Witness Who Denied Certain Events,

The prosecutor called Johnny Morrell to give testimony
further indicating that defendant was a dope dealer (R. 652-56).
In laying a foundation for Morrell's testimony, the prosecutor
asked Morrell if he recalled a conversation that Morrell had with
him in the presence of Kim Allen at the time of defendant's bail
hearing (R. 653). Morrell said he did not recall the
conversation and asked him what the conversation was about (R.
653).

When the prosecutor began to describe the setting,

defendant objected, arguing that the prosecutor was effectively
testifying about the conversation (R. 653-54).
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Accepting that

prosecutor was simply trying to refresh Morrell's recollection,
the trial court overruled the objection (R. 654). Thereafter,
the following conversation ensued:
MR. HEWARD: Isn't it true you walked up to me and Mr.
Allen as well and we were out by the elevator and you
specifically said, "Why are you guys being so hard on
Mike?"
MORRELL: Yes, probably.
MR. HEWARD: Okay. And isn't it true that my response
was because Mike was a dope dealer?
MORRELL: Yes.
MR. HEWARD: And isn't it true that when I said that -and in Mr. Allen's presence -- you simply went "so?"
MORRELL: No.
MR. HEWARD: You didn't do that?
MORRELL: I told you -- I told you that Mike was about
the only friend that was trying to get me to stop dope,
is what I told you.
MR. HEWARD: That was what you told me in Mr. Aliens's
presence.
MORRELL: Yes, sir.
MR. HEWARD: You didn't acknowledge that Mike was a dope
dealer?
MORRELL: I told you he was before and he quit and he
was trying to make me quit so he could get - - w e could
get a business going.
MR. HEWARD: Okay. So you specifically don't remember,
in Mr. Allen's presence in response to my statement of
him being a dope dealer, your saying u so?"
MORRELL: No.
MR. HEWARD: Your answer is you don't remember that?
MORRELL: No, I -- I don't remember talking to you and
Mr. Allen outside in the hall. I remember Mr. Allen
coming over and talking to me downstairs in the jail,
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asking me if I thought Mike was dangerous or not, and I
said no.
MR. HEWARD: Okay. You just indicated that you did
remember it two minutes ago. Now you're indicating you
don't remember it?
MORRELL: I -- I don't remember talking to you. I
remember talking to Mr. Allen like three times.
MR. HEWARD: Didn't you just testify, Mr. Morrell, as to
what the substance of our conversation was standing
outside the elevator on the 5th floor?
MORRELL: Yes.
(R. 654-56).
Based on this colloquy, defendant argues that his right to
confront witnesses under article I, section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Appellant's Br. at 21-24.

Particularly, defendant

asserts that by asking the witness questions referring in some
detail to their earlier conversation, the prosecutor improperly
testified to facts about which he could not be cross examined.
In support of his claim, defendant relies exclusively on State v.
Villareal. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).
In Villareal. the codefendant refused to answer a long
series of leading questions based on his confession.
P.2d at 422-23.

Id. 889

Thereafter, the prosecutor called a police

officer to confirm the substance of the codefendant's confession.
Id. at 423.

The supreme court held that the prosecutor's

presentation of the codefendant's testimony, coupled with the
police officer's testimony, was a denial of the defendant's right
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of confrontation because neither the witness nor the prosecutor
was subject to cross-examination.

Id.

Moreover, the denial of

effective cross examination was exacerbated by the inherent
unreliability of any codefendant's confession.

Id. at 424-25.

Villareal has no application to this case, if for no other
reason than that Morrell did not refuse to testify, but rather
denied the prosecutor's allegations.

See id. at 425 (indicating

that defendant was denied the effective opportunity for cross
examination because the witness was "wholly nonresponsive" with
respect to assertions about defendant and because he would
neither confirm nor deny facts central to establishing the
defendant's guilt).

Thus, because Morrell was willing to respond

to questions, he was subject to effective cross examination.
Secondly, because the prosecutor was a witness to the events
about which he was cross examining Morrell about, he too was
subject to cross-examination.

In any event, Morrell's testimony

was cumulative of Lieutenant Zimmerman's and Allen's as to
defendant's prior drug dealing, and was not particularly
important, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'/-£

day of November, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Kent E. Snider, Weber County Public Defenders Assoc,
attorneys for defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd., Suite #200,

zz:
Ogden, Utah 84401, this ^

day of November, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Irffuxum/uu v/w*~~

76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/
handgun — Persons not permitted to have —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
•shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is afirearm,explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree
felony.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice» confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*****

MAR 1 3 19' <

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

VS.

CASE NO. 951900120

MICHAEL MORRISON,
DEFENDANT.
*****

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, JUDGE, SITTING
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 2ND DAY OF AUGUST 1995.
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
*****

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE:

GARY R. HEWARD

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

JOHN B. HUTCHISON
*****

REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR
847 E. 2800 N.
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146
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OGDEN, UTAH

AUGUST 2. 1995

THE COURT:

YES.

MR. HUTCHISON:

WELL, THIS IS THE MORRISON MATTER.

MY MOTION IN LIMINY.

AND HERE'S THE CIRCUMSTANCES:

IT'S

ONE OF

THE TWO CHARGES THAT THE DEFENDANT IS FACING IS THE POSSESSION
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A PERSON CONVICTED OF A FELONY.
OF THE EVIDENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE —

PART

YOU MAY WANT TO

READ THE TRANSCRIPT WE HAVE OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.

PART

OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE OBVIOUSLY IS A PISTOL AND SOME
BULLETS THAT CAME OUT OF THE PISTOL.

THE PROSECUTION CLAIMS

THAT ONE OF THOSE BULLETS HAD KIM ALLEN'S, THE PROBATION
OFFICER WHO WAS MICHAEL MORRISON'S PROBATION OFFICER, HAS A K.
AND THE WORD ALLEN WRITTEN ON THE CASING.

AND THEY SAY THAT

STANDS SUGGESTIVELY AT LEAST FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT MR.
MORRISON MAY HAVE BEEN CONTEMPLATING USING THAT BULLET OR THAT
GUN ON HIS PROBATION OFFICER.
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM.

THE CHARGE ITSELF IS JUST

OF COURSE, THERE'S A CERTAIN AMOUNT

OF CONJECTURE IN THAT.
I WANT YOU TO LOOK AT THE BULLET BECAUSE I DON'T THINK
YOU CAN EVEN READ KIM ALLEN ON THE CASING OF THE BULLET.

WHEN

I SAY THAT, EVEN IF YOU DO BELIEVE THAT THE BULLET SAYS KIM
ALLEN ON IT, THAT THERE'S A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF CONJECTURE IN
THAT ARGUMENT THAT THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF PERMITTING THE
STATE TO TELL A JURY OR A FACT FINDER, DEPENDING ON WHO IT
WAS, THAT MICHAEL —

THAT THIS BULLET HAD MICHAEL MORRISON'S
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PROBATION OFFICER'S NAME ON IT, SUGGESTING WHATEVER THAT
SUGGESTS, IS ~

THE PREJUDICE OF THAT PARTICULAR PIECE OF

EVIDENCE SO FAR OUTWEIGHS ITS RELEVANCY ABOUT THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT HE'S IN POSSESSION OF THE FIREARM, THAT YOU
OUGHT TO LIMIT THE PROSECUTION FROM MAKING THAT PARTICULAR
ARGUMENT AND USING THAT BULLET FOR THAT PURPOSE.
AFTER YOU DETERMINE WHETHER THE WRITING IS SUFFICIENTLY
CLEAR ON THE CASING — WE DON'T BELIEVE IT'S SUFFICIENTLY
CLEAR THAT YOU COULD EVEN AS A MATTER OF CONJECTURE MAKE THAT
PROPOSITION THAT IT SAYS K. ALLEN ON IT, BUT EVEN IF YOU
BELIEVE IT DOES, WE SAY THAT ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT FAR
OUTWEIGHS ITS EVIDENTIARY VALUE.

AND IT'S ONE OF THOSE AREAS

WE HAVE THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE SOME DISCRETION TO MAKE THAT
PARTICULAR CALL, LIKE YOU DO OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF A BLOODY
PHOTO —

PHOTOGRAPHS OF A BLOODY CRIME SCENE, AND EVERYTHING

JUST — AND THE MERE POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON ITSELF, WHICH
WOULD BE A CRIME IF IT COULD BE PROVED TO BE IN HIS
POSSESSION.

BUT THEN YOU UNDERSTAND THE GUN IS LOCATED IN A

ROOM WHERE MICHAEL MORRISON IS SLEEPING, IT IS NOT LOCATED ON
HIS PERSON.

AND THEY COME IN PURSUANT TO ~ WELL, THEY COME

OUT WITH A WARRANT TO SEIZE THE GUN, BUT I ASSUME THAT WE'RE
USING THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY IN SEARCH WARRANTS
AND THE EVIDENCE I SUPPOSE IS TECHNICALLY SEIZED PURSUANT TO
THAT.
MR. HEWARD:

ACTUALLY, THE FIRST OFFICERS THAT ARRIVE
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AT MR. MORRISON'S HOME, HIS MOTHER'S HOME WHERE HE'S RESIDING,
ARRIVE THERE WITH AN ARREST WARRANT FOR HIM
MR. HUTCHISON:

RIGHT.

MR. HEWARD:

—

MR. HUTCHISON:

COMPLETELY.

MR. HEWARD:

—

ITS WAY.

~

UNRELATED TO —

THE SEARCH WARRANT THAT'S ALREADY ON

TWO AGENTS ARE FROM LAYTON CITY AND THE STRIKE

FORCE, NEITHER OF WHICH KNOW THAT THE OTHER ONE IS IN THE
PROCESS OF SERVING THE WARRANT FOR ARREST OR WARRANT TO
SEARCH.
MR. HUTCHISON:

RIGHT.

IT WAS —

THE LAYTON OFFICER

ONLY HAD AN ARREST WARRANT, WHICH THEY PROBABLY, MY OPINION
ANYWAY, HE CAN SEIZE IT WHEN HE SEES THAT GUN.
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
LATER.

NEVERTHELESS,

A SEARCH WARRANT'S COMING

AND WE RAN RIGHT INTO THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE

DISCOVERY UNDER THE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS BEHIND THE WEBER
COUNTY AGENCY.

BUT SINCE THE GUN WASN'T ON HIM, AND YOU HAVE

TO ARGUE IF THERE'S TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM, HE AND A LADY BY
THE NAME OF JILL CRITTENDEN IN THE ROOM, AND YOU HAVE TO ARGUE
INFERENTIALLY, CIRCUMSTANTIALLY SHOW THAT HE'S IN POSSESSION
OF THAT GUN.

THEY CAN FURTHER BELIEVE AND SAY WHAT'S MORE

IMPORTANT IS THE BULLET IN THE GUN HAS KIM ALLEN'S WRITING ON
THE CASING, AND KIM ALLEN IS MICHAEL'S PROBATION OFFICER, AND
THAT STANDS FOR BLACK DEEDS THAT ARE CONTEMPLATED BY MR.
MORRISON, WHICH WE SAY IS FAR TOO PREJUDICIAL TO BE PERMITTED

396

5
INTO EVIDENCE WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST THE RELEVANCY AND ANY
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL ~

HOW IT ALL FITS TOGETHER.

WE

HAVE A TRANSCRIPT OF A LENGTHY PRELIMINARY HEARING —
THE COURT:

LET ME JUST ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS.

I ASSUME FROM WHAT MR. HUTCHISON IS SAYING THAT THE WRITING
THAT YOU HAVE, PERCEIVED WRITING ON THE BULLET, WOULD TIE THE
WEAPON TO MR. MORRISON?
MR. HEWARD:

CORRECT.

WHAT MR. HUTCHISON HASN'T

RAISED OR — AND I'M NOT SURE THAT HE'S CONTEMPLATED IT,
ALTHOUGH HE'S LAID YOU A LITTLE BIT OF A BACKGROUND AND
HISTORY, IS THAT THERE ARE TWO PEOPLE PRESENT IN THE ROOM.
THERE'S MR. MORRISON AND THERE'S JILL TEETER OR JILL
CRITTENDEN, WHICH IS THE NAME SHE GOES BY.

IT'S THE STATE'S

POSITION THAT THE REASON THAT THIS SHOULD COME IN AND THE
REASON THAT THE PROBATIVE VALUE OUTWEIGHS THE PREJUDICIAL
VALUE UNDER RULE 403 IS THAT THE WRITING ON THERE —

AND I

HAVEN'T REALLY EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT AS FAR AS HIM
TRYING TO GET HIS PROBATION OFFICER -- IT'S OUR POSITION THAT
THE REASON THAT IT'S RELEVANT IS, IS BECAUSE THIS DEFENDANT IS
THE ONLY PERSON WHO HAS ANY CONNECTION TO KIM ALLEN.

THE

BULLET WOULD SHOW A NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERSON WHO LOADED THE
GUN OR WHO HAD THE BULLETS AND KIM ALLEN, WHICH COMES BACK TO
THIS DEFENDANT.

NOT TO JILL TEETER OR TO JILL CRITTENDEN,

WHICHEVER NAME SHE GOES BY.

THAT'S WHAT I BELIEVE THE

PROBATIVE VALUE IS SHOWING THE NEXUS TO THIS DEFENDANT BECAUSE
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HE'S THE PERSON WHO KNOWS KIM ALLEN.
WHEN MR. HUTCHISON SAID HE'S HIS PROBATION OFFICER, THAT
IS ACTUALLY SOMETHING IN THE PAST.

AT THE TIME THIS GOES

DOWN, MR. MORRISON IS OFF OF PAROLE.

I MEAN HE HAS BEEN

PREVIOUSLY SUPERVISED BY EITHER MR. ALLEN OR BY AGENTS WHO
WORK FOR MR. ALLEN IN HIS CAPACITY AS SUPERVISOR FOR ADULT
PROBATION AND PAROLE.

AND MR. MORRISON UNQUESTIONABLY KNOWS

MR. ALLEN, HAS KNOWN HIM FOR QUITE A PERIOD OF TIME.
AND I HAVE THE BULLET HERE, BUT WE DON'T THINK THE
RELEVANCE IS NECESSARILY SHOWING HE WANTS TO GET KIM ALLEN.
THE RELEVANCE IS SHOWING THAT THIS IS A PERSON WHO KNOWS KIM
ALLEN, AND THEREBY CONNECTING HIM UP WITH THE GUN BECAUSE MR.
HUTCHISON POINTS OUT THERE ARE TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM.

IT'S

NOT THERE IF HE'S NOT IN POSSESSION OF IT.
MR. HUTCHISON:

WELL, THERE'S A COUPLE OF THINGS I NEED

TO SAY ABOUT THAT, TOO, YOUR HONOR.
GOOD LOOK AT IT.

WE WANT YOU TO TAKE A

IT'S TRUE THERE'S TWO PEOPLE IN THE ROOM,

BUT IT DIDN'T REALLY OCCUR TO ME —

OF COURSE I KNEW IT, BUT

IT DIDN'T REALLY OCCUR TO ME TO REALLY SAY THE NEXUS ISN'T AS
IMMEDIATE AS HIM BEING THE PROBATION OFFICER WHICH MAKES THE
PREJUDICIAL VALUE EVEN MORE.

THE FACT THAT HE'S BEEN

SUPERVISED IN THE PAST BY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE AND
ALLEN'S A SUPERVISOR THERE, MAKES IT EVEN MORE TANGENTIAL.
ARE YOU SURE THAT JILL TEETER WAS NEVER SUPERVISED BY HIM?
MR. HEWARD:

AS FAR AS I KNOW, THAT'S CORRECT. AS
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FAR AS I KNOW, UNTIL SHE HAD BEEN RECENTLY CONVICTED, SHE HAD
NEVER BEEN ON PROBATION.
MR. HUTCHISON:

IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THE BULLET TO SEE

IF YOU CAN EVEN READ THAT.
THE COURT:

LET ME LOOK AT IT.

MR. HUTCHISON:

HE DOESN'T WANT YOU SMEARING IT.

MR. HEWARD:

THERE'S ONE ADDITIONAL FACTOR THAT I

THINK SHOULD PLAY INTO YOUR HONOR'S DETERMINATION, AND THAT
IS, THE ARREST WARRANT THAT ARRIVES FOR MR. MORRISON ON THAT
MORNING IS DONE AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT IN A
STOLEN FRONT TRANSACTION.

THERE'S A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE

PERSON THE POLICE USED AND KIM ALLEN ON THAT, AND THIS
DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE REASON TO KNOW THAT.

THEREBY, ANOTHER

CONNECTION BACK TO KIM ALLEN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WRITES ON
THE BULLET OR IS IN POSSESSION OF THE BULLET.
FOR THE RECORD, MR. OLSEN, I AM SHOWING HIS HONOR A .357
CALIBER CARTRIDGE.

IT IS WHAT IS KNOWN AS BIRDSHOT LOAD,

NORMAL CASING, AND THEN A CAP THAT YOU CAN LOOK AT AND,
BECAUSE IT'S TRANSPARENT, SEE THAT THERE ARE B.B.'S IN IT.
I PROBABLY SHOULD MAKE A FURTHER RECORD, THAT IS ONE OF
FIVE BULLETS THAT WERE ACTUALLY IN THE FIREARM AT THE TIME.
NONE OF THE OTHER FIVE HAD ANY WRITING ON THEM.

THEY ALL WERE

.357'S, AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH WAS A SIMILAR BIRDSHOT LOAD AS
YOU HAVE IN YOUR HAND, AND THE OTHER WHICH WERE STANDARD .357
LOADED WITH THE STANDARD JACKETED BULLET.

8
MR. HUTCHISON:

I THOUGHT THAT AT LEASE ONE AND MAYBE

TWO WITNESSES SAID THERE WERE SIX SHELLS.
MR. HEWARD:

I DON'T REMEMBER.

THERE'S FIVE IN THE

POUCH, THEY'VE BEEN CHECKED OUT OF EVIDENCE AND BROUGHT UP.
AND IF I COUNTED CORRECTLY —
MR. HUTCHISON:

I DON'T THINK THAT'S VERY CLEAR AND CAN

BE READ FOR A LOT OF DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS, AND WHEN YOU ADD
THAT INTO THE FACTOR THAT HE WASN'T EVEN BEING SUPERVISED BY
ALLEN AND THAT DEVASTATING IMPACT OF THAT KIND OF TESTIMONY, I
SAY IT'S —

SAY IT SHOULD STAY OUT.

WE HAVE THE TRANSCRIPTS

IF YOU WANT TO READ THEM SO YOU CAN SEE HOW IT ALL FITS
TOGETHER.
THE COURT:
WHETHER THERE —

IF THERE'S A SERIOUS ISSUE CONCERNING
THE GUN IS HIS OR NOT HIS, THEN IT SEEMS TO

ME THAT THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THIS IS FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT.

I

AGREE WITH MR. HUTCHISON'S ANALYSIS, THAT'S A MORE DEVASTATING
PART OF THAT WHEN YOU THINK BACK TO THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. ALLEN AND THE —

AND THE DEFENDANT.

I WOULD THEREFORE INSTRUCT AND GRANT THE MOTION IN LIMINE AT
LEAST TO THIS EXTENT:

THAT THE STATE CAN TALK ABOUT THE FACT

THAT THEY ARE ACQUAINTED, THEY'VE HAD ASSOCIATIONS IN THE
PAST, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVE REASON TO BE ANGRY AT
KIM ALLEN.

THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ACRIMONY IF INDEED THAT'S

THE CASE. AND I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT'S THE CASE OR NOT.
BUT THAT THEY ARE NOT TO REFERENCE THE FACT THAT THE
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RELATIONSHIP AROSE OUT OF A PAROLE OFFICER-PAROLEE
RELATIONSHIP.
MR. HUTCHISON:
TO —

ALL RIGHT. AND I — AND HE'LL HAVE

I SUPPOSE HE'LL HAVE TO PUT ON SOME EVIDENCE OF SOME

SORT OF ANIMOSITY, TOO.

THAT I DON'T THINK HE'S GOT THAT.

HE'S NOT ON PAROLE. AND THEY NEVER HAD ANY TROUBLE.
MR. HEWARD:

AS I INDICATED —

THE COURT:

I SAID IF INDEED THERE IS THAT EVIDENCE

AVAILABLE.

BUT THEY'RE ENTITLED OBVIOUSLY TO —

MR. HUTCHISON:

BUT HE'LL BE JUST —

BUT IF IT COMES IN

AT ALL, IS WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, HE'LL JUST BE AN INDIVIDUAL
MORRISON KNOWS.

HE WON'T BE A FORMER SUPERVISING PAROLE

OFFICER.
THE COURT:

THAT'S THE POINT.

MR. HUTCHISON:

OKAY.

MR. HEWARD:

AND I SUPPOSE THE POINT MAY BE MOOT,

ANYWAY.
MR. HUTCHISON:

IF HE TAKES THE STAND.

MR. HEWARD:

IF HE TAKES THE STAND OR IF THE CASE IS

TRIED TO HIS HONOR.
MR. HUTCHISON:

YEAH.

I SUPPOSE IT WOULD AT THAT POINT

IN TIME, BUT WE'RE STILL KEEPING THE OPTION OPEN IN CASE THE
CASE GOES JURY.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. HUTCHISON:

THAT YOU.

OKAY.
ARE YOU MAKING A FINDING YOU

401

10
CAN READ K. ALLEN ON THAT?
THE COURT:

DO YOU THINK YOU CAN?

WELL, WE'LL ALLOW THE JURY TO MAKE THE

DETERMINATION IF THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS.
MR. HUTCHISON:

I THINK IT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION.

THE COURT:

I THINK IT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION.

MR. HUTCHISON:

ALL RIGHT.

OKAY.

*****
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ADDENDUM C

1

THE COURT:

2

JURORS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HEWARD:

Good morning.

Good morning.
You may proceed.
We are.

5

recall Kim Allen, Your Honor.

6

resworn, Your Honor?

7

THE COURT:

8
9
10

State would

Do you want him

No.

KIM ALLEN,
being previously sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

11
12

BY MR. HEWARD:

13

Q.

14

that?

15

A.

I realize that.

16

Q.

All right.

17

you yesterday.

18

your experience, do you deal regularly with meth

19

users and sellers?

20

A.

Yes, I do.

21

Q.

And is it common for you to see people who are

22

using and selling meth to become extremely paranoid?

23

A.

24

of the problems with meth.

25

Q.

Mr. Allen, you are still under oath.

You realize

A couple of things that I didn't ask
Specifically, have you in your job,

Yes, that's one of the characteristics.

All right.

It's one

Based upon that, when you found out
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1

that there was a bullet recovered with your name on

2

it in a search warrant of Mr, Morrison's home, did

3

that cause you concern?

4

A.

Yes, it did.

5

Q.

Did you stop and think about anything that could

6

have occurred in the time period immediately prior to

7

this that could have caused him

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

—

10

A.

Yes, I did.

11

Q.

What would that have been?

12

A.

Probably, oh, maybe a month prior to Mike's

13

arrest, I#d been working late and was notified over

14

the radio that the Strike Force needed some

15

assistance on a search at Mike Morrison's house and

16

was wondering if I knew where he lived and if I'd

17

been there.

18

well.

19

deputies from Davis County.

20

recovered some stolen property, stolen snow blowers

21

from his place, and then Mike took us over to another

22

place and got another stolen snow blower.

23

figured maybe that got him upset at me.

to be upset at you?

I told them, yeah, I knew the family

So I assisted Mike Ashment and a couple of

24
25

—

We went to Mike's home,

MR. HUTCHISON:
excused.

So I

I'd like the jury

I'd like to have a bench conference, side

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
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1

bar with you.

2
3

THE COURT:

Would you mind stepping

out, please?

4

(WHEREUPON, at this time the jury leaves the

5

courtroom, after which proceedings resume as

6

follows:)

7

MR. HUTCHISON:

8

mistrial.

9

it.

Moving for a

That is so prejudicial you can't believe

There is absolutely no determination of fact

10

that any snow blowers were stolen.

11

litigation on that issue.

12

not charged which is put before the jury.

13

clear basis for a mistrial.

14

There's been no

It's another crime that's

MR. HEWARD:

It's a

Specifically, it goes

15

to his motive, Your Honor, as to whether or not he

16

would be the person who had a bullet with Mr. Allen's

17

name on it.

18

directly in the way that I did and limited it to not

19

a time period which I asked Mr. Allen to go through

20

his —

21

with him over a period of time as a probation officer

22

or parole officer.

23

It's specifically to motive and, again, to tie this

24

defendant to the bullet.

25

That's why I couched my questions

his experience with Mr. Morrison and dealing

I stayed completely away from it.

MR. HUTCHISON:

We've got a
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1

situation, number one, where you've granted a motion

2

in limine which now means nothing.

3

absolutely means nothing, your order of limine

4

because your original order was that the testimony

5

could come in that Kim Allen knew the defendant, and

6

that was the extent of it.

7

ordered on the motion in limine.

8
9

I mean,

And that is what you

That is completely destroyed now.

Now we have

evidence of a crime that he's never been convicted

10

of, with a suggestion from Allen that he committed it

11

and the property was received there, which is so

12

clearly prejudicial that I'm entitled to a mistrial.

13
14

MR. HEWARD:
Honor.

15
16

We would disagree, Your

THE COURT:

I don't think you're

entitled to respond at this point.

17

MR. HEWARD:

18

THE COURT:

Okay.
I think —

I think that

19

the testimony has limited relevance relating to

20

motive to put a name on a bullet that was found in a

21

gun which may tie him to the gun.

22
23

MR. HEWARD:
contested issue.

24
25

Which is a hotly

THE COURT:

Well, let me finish,

please.
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1

The concern I have is that the statement

2

relating to the snow blowers is extraneous and highly

3

prejudicial.

4

and —

5

And, therefore, to go —

6

that he was there on a search warrant doesn't really

7

add anything and really is prejudicial.

8

sure that it reaches prejudice to the level of

9

granting a mistrial.

and it has no relevance to the issues here,

10
11

It has nothing to do with this case

to have gone beyond the fact

MR. HUTCHISON:
of

I —

I'm not

It's an allegation

—

12

THE COURT:

Now, wait just a second.

13

What I would intend on doing is to instruct the jury

14

that they're —

15

he apparently hasn't been charged with that?

16
17

MR. HUTCHISON:

—

Hasn't been

convicted.

18
19

that the theft of a snow blower is

MR. MORRISON:

They dismissed the

charges.

20

MR. HEWARD:

It's a Davis County

21

case, and the defendant's going to testify.

22

clearly say those charges were dismissed.

23

MR. HUTCHISON:

24

not —

25

we have to defend other charges.

He can

You know, we're

we're not supposed to be in a situation where
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THE COURT:

He doesn't have to

explain anything.
MR. HEWARD:
to, Your Honor.

I know he doesn't have

I wasn't suggesting that he had to.
THE COURT:

Well, but the concern I

have is that there has been prejudice by reason of
this.

I'm not sure that it would be —

that it would

reach the level of granting a mistrial, and I'll
attempt to resolve the issue by instructing the jury
that.
MR. HUTCHISON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HUTCHISON:
so it's clear.

Now?

Okay.

I want it now

I'm not withdrawing my motion for a

mistrial, but I certainly want any curative things
done now.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I'll attempt to

cure the problem by explaining to them that -MR. HUTCHISON:

It's an unproven

allegation that has nothing to do with this case.
THE COURT:

In fact, if —

how do

you feel about my instructing the jury that there
were charges filed against him on that, but were
dismissed, and that that has no relevance to this
proceeding and to disregard that statement?
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MR. HUTCHISON:

1

Well, I don't —

2

love that except I don't —

3

Court —

4

I don't think anything has happened on it.

5

think they have been formally dismissed.

6

just sitting there.

to be candid with the

and I'll try to be candid with the Court

7

MR. HEWARD:

8

MR. HUTCHISON:

9

I don't
They are

That's not true.

MR. HEWARD:

They have been

They have been

dismissed.

12

MR. HUTCHISON:

13

MR. HEWARD:

Have they?

I checked with the

14

Davis County Attorney's office d ay before yesterday

15

to find[ out what the status w a s .
MR. HUTCHISON:

16
17

that.

MR. HEWARD:

To find out what the

status was.
MR. HUTCHISON:

20
21

definit ely want •that

22

motion.

Well, then yeah, I

I'm not withdrawing my earlier

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. HUTCHISON:

25

Well, I didn't know

Huh?

18
19

—

dismissed?

10
11

I'd

I understand.
Because I consider

the pre judice to be devastating.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

The Court

2

the Court will attempt to remedy what I consider to

3

be prejudicial.

4
5

MR. HUTCHISON:

8
9
10
11

Thank

you, Your Honor.

6
7

All right.

THE COURT:

Let's bring the jury

back.
(WHEREUPON, at this time the jury returns to
the courtroom, after which proceedings resume as
follows:)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of

12

the jury, quite frequently during the course of a

13

trial, things will come up unexpectedly which really

14

shouldn't come to your attention.

15

some testimony that —

16

case was involved with some stolen snow blowers.

17

There has been

that the defendant in this

Now, that hasn't got anything at all to do

18

with this case and I'm instructing you specifically

19

that you're to completely disregard it.

20

kind of back up and fortify the importance of not

21

considering it, the Court's instructing you that

22

charges were filed and dismissed.

23

—

And just to

So that's not something that, in fairness, you

24

ought to consider when you're determining the guilt

25

or innocence of the defendant in this case.
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ADDENDUM D

1

Q.

Yes.

2

A.

All I saw was the ammunition.

3

other weapons.

4

Q.

5

retrieve or retrieve what Ms. Teeter had placed at

6

some other location upon your initially entering the

7

room?

8

A.

Officer Swanson did.

9

Q.

Where was that placed by her?

10

A.

It was placed in a dresser that was on the south

11

side of the bed.

12

Q.

And what side of the bed was the defendant on?

13

A.

He was on the south side when we came in.

14

crawled over him to get to the dresser.

15

Q.

16

interrogate the defendant?

17

A . I

18

Q.

Was that in Ms. Teeter's presence?

19

A.

Yes, it was.

20

Q.

And did he initially indicate a willingness to

21

talk to you?

22

A . I

23

to me.

24

Q.

25

stopped him?

I did not see

Did yourself or Officer Swanson attempt to

She

Did you ever interview or specifically

started talking to him very briefly upstairs.

got the indication that he was willing to talk

And did Ms. Teeter do or say something that
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1

A.

She told him to shut up.

2

Q.

Did he do that?

3

A.

He did.

4

Q.

Did she tell him once or more than once?

5

A.

It was twice that she told him to shut up.

6

Q.

Were you aware of any narcotics in the room?

7

A.

Yes, I was.

8

Q.

What were you aware of?

9

A.

When officer —

or Detective Swanson went to the

10

drawer, he found a syringe, and I think there was a

11

baggie of some powder that we suspected to be

12

methamphetamine.

13

Q.

14

knowledge or ownership of that?

15

A.

16

In your presence, did the defendant ever disclaim

I think initially

—

MR. HUTCHISON:

Wait a minute.

I'm

17

going to impose an objection here.

First of all,

18

once he has started to remain silent then we need to

19

have some foundation here.

20

disclaiming -- or the lack of disclaimer is not a

21

proper evidentiary question.

22

MR. HEWARD:

He's not —

the fact of

I'm not sure that it's

23

not proper evidentiary, and I anticipate laying a

24

foundation as far as the defendant's

25

MR. HUTCHISON:

—

You need to lay it

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510

* nQ
^°

1

first then.
arrest and Miranda

MR. HEWARD:

2
3

with the officer who 's coming up immediately

4

following this officer.
But you just can't

5

MR. HUTCHISON:

6

ask a question about disclaimer out of the blue

7

without setting the foundation.

8

preliminary things, first of all, when he's obviously

9

made an election, either directly or indirectly, to

10

He's done

remain silent.
THE COURT:

11

(By Mr. Heward)

Had —

Sustained.
when you talk about the

12

Q.

13

defendant -- I'll back up a little.

14

about the defendant initially, you believe, being

15

willing to talk to you upstairs and then Ms. Teeter

16

telling him to shut up and him doing that, did the

17

was that done prior to or after you were downstairs

18

in the room?

19

A.

That was after we'd been downstairs.

20

Q.

All right.

21

or any opportunity the defendant would have had to

22

disclaim what you believed to be narcotics found in

23

the room was done before he went upstairs and at Ms.

24

Teeter's request remained silent?

25

A.

When you talk

—

So any discussion you would have had

Correct.
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1

A.

Yes, he had.

2

Q.

And had you continued on, apparen*tly, sell ing and

3

usi ng drugs?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

But he had been out of commission the whol e time;

6

is that correct?

7

A.

Yes.

That's true.
MR. HUTCHISON:

8

Your wit ness.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

9
10

BY MR. HEWARD:

11

Q.

12

tim e, did you, Jill?

13

A.

14

since I was arrested.

15

Q.

16

off icer from Layton was trying to talk to Mike at

17

Mik e's home, you were telling Michael to shut up?

18

A.

19

to —

20

whi le the police were there.

21

Q.

So the answer is?

22

A.

He advised me to be quiet and for Michael to do

23

the same.

24

Q.

25

up?

You didn't claim all this stuff was y ours at the

I —

Okay.

this is the first time I've iseen this stuff

And, in fact, specifically when the police

I had my lawyer on the other phone.

He to Id me

I was talking to Kelly Cardon on th e phone

So the answer is yes, you told Michae 1 to shut
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1

A.

Yes, I did.

2

Q.

The gun and s pecific items specifically

3

identifying as be ing Michael's came out of his

4

drawer.

5

Blockbuster rental card, this is his personal papers

6

and effects.

7

A.

(Nods head up and down.)

8

Q.

Yes?

9

A.

Uh huh.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

in?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Not -- not in a drawer that had your personal

14

items in it?

15

A.

I didn't have a lot of personal items there.

16

Q.

So the answer is no, it was not in a drawer that

17

had your personal items in it?

18

A.

That is true.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

you 've already be en through the system —

21

is no additional charges that can be filed against

22

you because your charges on this case have already

23

been adjudicated, correct?

24

A.

I'm not aware of that.

25

Q.

Your charges on this case have been adjudicated?

This is his prescription bottle, this is his

That is the same drawer that the gun was

You obviously recognize that -- because
that there
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